The primitive secret handshake is a kind of privacy-preserving authentication protocol, in which the participants can share a common session key if and only if they come from the same group, without the leakage of the group information. Most of the current secret handshakes are realized by means of bilinear maps, whose computational cost is a lot. A new multi-party secret handshake scheme is proposed in this paper using the chaotic map, with the computational cost reducing significantly. The new protocol also supports user revocation, and has the ability of tracing users, meanwhile proved to achieve the basic security properties of secret handshakes.
Introduction
The secret handshake protocol, which provides privacy-preserving authentication among users belonging to the same group, was first proposed by Balfanz et al. [1] as a two-party protocol with three-round using pairing based cryptography. Balfanz et al. ' s protocol realizes the property of affiliation-hiding that prevents an adversary from learning anything about the group or the user identity by eavesdropping or even executing the protocol with a legal user. However, there exists some drawbacks in this original secret handshake, for example it needs multiple credentials which is a burden in computational cost, and the protocol is linkable, which means that different sessions executed by the same user can be linked by reusing the user's certificate.
Several secret handshake protocols have been proposed [5, 12, 13, 15, 16, 24, 25, 34] after the work of Balfanz et al.. Castelluccia proposed a secret handshake based on CA-Oblivious encryption [3] , which improves the efficiency of Balfanz et al. ' s secret handshake scheme [1] . Xu and Yung constructed a secret handshake scheme [34] the same year, which achieves unlinkability. But their scheme only satisfies the property of k-anonymity, which means that an adversary can deduce that an executor of a session is one out of certain k users.
All the protocols introduced above only consider two participants. Ysudik and Xu first expand the number of participants to more than two, proposing the first Group Secret Handshake scheme [29] in the setting of multi-party taking part. In a group secret handshake protocol, two or more users from the same group could authenticate with each other without the leakage of group information. However, their protocol does not establish a common shared key for participants after authentication. Jarecki et al. introduced the notion of Affiliation-Hiding Authenticated Group Key Agreement (AH-AGKA), and proposed two concrete AH-AGKA schemes [14] . Xu et al. proposed the concept of Affiliation-Hiding Authenticated Asymmetric Group Key Agreement (AH-AAGKA) [35] , and proposed an AH-AAGKA scheme [32] to improve the one of Jarecki et al. They proposed another AH-AAGKA scheme [33] which reduces the communication round to only one.
Efficient revocation is an important element in designing a secret handshake scheme. Revocation is also closely related with the property of linkability. A pseudonym instead of the real identity of a user is often used to realize the function of revocation. In a linkable protocol, the group administrator (GA) simply puts the pseudonym of a user into a certificate revocation list to revoke them, making revocation very simple. But to realize the property of unlinkability requires one-time certificates, which would cost a lot. Sorniotti and Molva proposed a secret handshake with revocation support [28] , meanwhile maintaining the property of unlinkability.
Thanks to its property of affiliation hiding, the multi-party secret handshake can be used as a useful tool for secure communication among users whose identities need to be kept secret. The new types of networks, such as the wireless sensor network (WSN) [10] , the vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) [11] , the WSN [10] , the underwater sensor network (UWSN) [27] and the wireless mesh network (WMN) [8] , can use it to ensure that the users of the same property can secretly verify the identity of others, meanwhile establishing a shared key. When applied to these types of networks, one has to consider the malicious users who might damage the communicating system using network attacks such as DoS. Thus it is quite important to detect the identity of these kinds of users, meanwhile protecting other legitimate users' identities from being detected by adversaries.
Computational cost is of great importance in designing secret handshake schemes, especially when applied to concrete environment mentioned above. Most of the secret handshake schemes introduced above are realized by using the bilinear maps. It is, of course, an efficient tool to implement a secret handshake. However, the computational cost that it brings about is quite high. The notion of Chebyshev polynomial was first introduced by Mason and Handcomb in 2003 [26] . It has been used to construct authenticated key agreement [6, 21, 22, 31, [36] [37] [38] [39] by some researchers. In addition, its computational cost is much lower than that of a bilinear map. However, its usage in the field of secret handshake is not in much concern.
In this paper, we design a new multi-party secret handshake scheme based on chaotic maps (MPSH-CM). We adopted the idea of Sorniotti and Molva [28] of using the matching reference and pseudonym to realize the function of revocation while achieving the property of unlinkability as well.
The usage of chaotic maps significantly reduces the computational cost compared to other multi-party secret handshakes using bilinear maps. Our protocol also concerns about those malicious users in the environment of concrete application, the MANET for example. When GA is aware of malicious attacks from users, it will trace the identity of malicious users and revoke them to avoid further damages. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces Chebyshev chaotic map and the corresponding attack against it. Section 3 introduces the basic models and definitions of secret handshakes, including the security requirements. Section 4 presents our new multi-party secret handshakes based on chaotic maps. The protocol will be proved secure in Section 5. Section 6 analyzes the performance of our protocol. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some basic knowledge of Chebyshev chaotic map [26] . For more information, please refer to [2, 20, 30] .
Chebyshev chaotic map
is a polynomial in x of degree n, which is defined as:
Its recurrence relation is defined recursively as:
The Chebyshev polynomial satisfies the following properties:
1 The semi-group property:
where , r s Z * ∈ and
2 The chaotic property: When the degree n satisfies 1 n > , the Chebyshev polynomial map ( ) : [ 1, 1] 
of degree n is a chaotic map with its invariant density being
for Lyaounov exponent ln n λ = .
For the purpose of improving security, Zhang [38] extends the range of the semi-group property, proving that the semi-group property holds for Chebyshev polynomials defined on ( , ) −∞ +∞ :
where 2, ( , ) n x ≥ ∈ −∞ +∞ , and p is a large prime. Apparently, 
Models and definitions
In a secret handshake scheme, a set of users 1 , , n u u  of the same property p form a group G, and the common property p is generally regarded as the group identity of the group G. A group administrator (GA) is in charge of creating the group and issues credentials to legal users for adding members. According to the definitions introduced in [1] , our multiparty secret handshake scheme consists of the following probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms: _ Setup. The Setup algorithm generates and outputs the public parameters param on the input of a security parameter l. The group public key pk is also included in the public parameters param, and the private key sk is kept secret by GA.
Information Technology and Control 2017/1/46 _ Add Member. The Add Member algorithm is executed between user u and GA, and takes param and sk as input. If u is verified to own the property p, GA chooses and outputs a credential u cred for u using the group key pk and sk. A pseudonym is often used as the identity of u instead of his real identity, and is included in the credential. After receiving the credential, user u becomes a member of the group. _ Handshake. Suppose n users take part in the Handshake algorithm. The algorithm takes the credentials of each user as the secret input and param as the public input. The output of the protocol for each member is either 'reject' or 'accept'. If and only if all of the n users belong to the same group (i.e., all of the n users own the same property p), then the outputs be 'accept'. If the n outputs from the n users are all 'accept', the handshake is successfully performed and a common session key is shared among the n users.
_ Trace Member. The Trace Member algorithm is executed by GA in order to trace the identity of member u. The algorithm takes the publicly transmitted messages and outputs the identity of u.
_ Revoke Member. The Revoke Member algorithm is executed by GA in case that a user needs to be revoked. It takes the current revocation list (denoted as rev L ) and the pseudonym of u. In addition, the output is an up-to-date list rev L . After the algorithm, the group will not include u as its legal member, while u will never be able to take part in any handshakes.
Security properties.
A secret handshake scheme should satisfy the following security properties:
1 Completeness. If all of the n users belong to the same group and execute the Handshake protocol honestly, then all n users output 'accept'.
Detector Resistance. If an adversary activates a
Handshake with a legal member, he will be able to detect the affiliation information of the member with a negligible probability. In other words, the protocol is affiliation hiding.
3 Impersonator Resistance. An adversary can successfully impersonate a legitimate member of a group with negligible probability. As explained in [15] , the impersonator resistance implies the untraceability property.
A new multi-party secret handshake scheme based on chaotic maps
In this section, a new multi-party secret handshake scheme based on chaotic maps (MPSH-CM) will be introduced. The construction of our protocol is as follows: _ Setup. Given the security parameter l, the Setup algorithm outputs the system's public parameters as , , , , , u u C C > via a secure channel, where and checking the two equations:
GA issues to u the matching reference
to make sure that user u can use it to verify the group identity of other users, which is also an indicator of the ability of u to verify and communicate with other users with property p.
Step 3. After receiving messages { } If there exits rev rev L ∈ such that it satisfies equation (14), i u exposes the revoked user 1 i u − and discards the current instance by output the 'reject' message; or the protocol proceeds.
Step 4. If there is no 'reject' message, i u will compute i X as follows:
i u then publishes the message{ , } i i X τ .
Step 5. After receiving { } ject' message will be published, and the protocol is ceased.
Step 6. i u computes
...
as the shared key and outputs an 'accept' message.
Figure 1
The handshake phase of MPSH-CM
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Step2
If there exits rev rev L ∈ such that it satisfies equation (14), i u exposes the revoked user 1 i u − and discards the current instance by output the 'reject' message; or the protocol proceeds.
Step4. If there is no 'reject' message, i u will compute i X as follows: 
• Trace Member. If GA finds that there exist malicious users causing damages to the system, it uses the message ,1 i M , and finds the exact user with pseudonym i x . This can be done because GA knows all pseudonyms of users and can use this knowledge to exhaustive verify whether
until a x * which satisfies equation (17) is found, which means the identity of the user is found.
• Revoke Member. GA keeps a public revocation list rev L , where GA has the right of read and write, while others can only read the list. The list consists of the items rev xP = . If a user u is being revoked for some reason (e.g., u carries out a DoS attack to the system), then GA traces the identity of u, i.e. the pseudonym , u p x and the item rev = , u p x P will be added to the list.
... 
until a x * which satisfies equation (17) is found, which means the identity of the user is found. _ Revoke Member. GA keeps a public revocation list rev L , where GA has the right of read and write, while others can only read the list. The list consists of the items rev xP = . If a user u is being revoked for some reason (e.g., u carries out a DoS attack to the system), then GA traces the identity of u, i.e. the pseudonym , u p x and the item rev = , u p x P will be added to the list.
Security
In this section, it is proved that our protocol obeys the four security properties: Completeness, Detector Resistance, Impersonator Resistance and Unlinkability as introduced in Section 3.
Completeness
If all of the n users own the same property p, and execute the Handshake protocol honestly, it can be easily verified that As we defined before, the subscript i is set to mod i n, which means that That is to say that 1
Detector resistance
For an adversary A, whose goal is to detect the affiliation information of a user without legal credential, we define a game denoted as GameDetect. GameDetect is executed between adversary A and a challenger B. It is developed as follows:
Then B simulates the process of Setup and Add Member, and sets the public parameters and the revocation list of all groups public. 
Analysis of A's response:
If A can verify that the message M φ contains the property 0 p , then outputs 0
All the possible messages that B might release are:
According to the intractability of the DLP problem, it is hard to compute a with the knowledge of ( ) 
So A guesses φ′ with the probability that
ty that A wins the game GameDetect is:
game GameDetect with negligible advantage, and it comes to the conclusion that security property of detector resistance. . A is then free to take part (23) where ε is negligible. So A guesses φ′ with the probability that
Thus, the probability that A wins the game GameDetect is:
So A can win the game GameDetect with negligible advantage, and it comes to the conclusion that our protocol obeys the security property of detector resistance.
Impersonator resistance
For an adversary A, whose goal is to impersonate a legitimate user without owning a legal credential, we define a game denoted as GameImp. Challenge: B acts as user u * with property p * and engages in the protocol with A. Note that A does not have the legal credential for u * . A attempts to generate the correct key and let B believe that she is a legitimate user with property p * . Output: If the adversary A succeeds in computing a corresponding correct session key and executing the Handshake phase with B successfully, the output is ''1''. Otherwise, the game outputs ''0''. What's needed to be added is that A should pass the revocation check in order to successfully win the game, which means that A cannot use the identities that she queried before (they are all revoked soon after the Query phase is over).
Analysis of A's response:
Here there are only two users taking part, so n equals 2. As A does not know the legal credential of any identity, she fakes one by choosing some numbers randomly and sends the following messages: oal is to verify whether two handshake instances are executed by the same d Link. The game is executed between A and a challenger B. A is able to (33) with ε being negligible, which means that So A can win the game GameImp with negligible advantage, concluding that our protocol obeys the security property of Impersonator Resistance.
Unlinkability
For an adversary A, whose goal is to verify whether two handshake instances are executed by the same user, we define a game named Link. The game is executed between A and a challenger B. A is able to engage in protocol executions, not to say eavesdropping the protocol instance. Note that the pseudonym , i i u p x is the only element that associates with the identity, and it only appears in ,1 i M and can only be verified by equation (14) described above in our protocol. So we mainly concern the messages Table 1 Symbols for computational cost evaluation
